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Interest in Demand Response (DR) is increasing due to its potential to improve reliability and save costs
for electricity systems. DR can provide a sustainable and cost-effective option for supply balancing,
especially in a scenario with more volatile inﬂows from renewable energy sources. End-users can be
incentivized to provide DR through time-based pricing in general and dynamic pricing in particular. This
paper provides a theoretic framework and practice-oriented review of the status of DR in Europe, out-
lining the major challenges currently hampering further DR development. Important challenges involve
the split-incentive issue for investments in enabling technologies, traditional market rules for ﬂexibility
that favor large generation units and the need for electricity market and network operation coordination.
© 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Increasing penetration levels of intermittent renewable energy
sources (RES) in power systems are imposing new challenges for
policy makers and regulators. These renewable resources can be
located at locations within both high-voltage and low-voltage
grids. The penetration of distributed energy resources (DER), such
as distributed generation (DG), electric storage and electric vehicles
(EVs), signiﬁcantly affect the operations of distribution grids
(Perez-Arriaga and Bharatkumar, 2014; Pudjianto et al., 2007).
Ensuring reliable electricity supply in this context is costly
endeavor given the requirement for back-up ﬂexible electric power
generation combined with limited electricity transmission capac-
ity. Regulatory authorities are increasingly considering load ﬂexi-
bility, also known as demand response (DR), for enhancing system
coordination. DR refers in general to the ability of the demand side
to be ﬂexible, responsive and adaptive to economic signals.
Adequate price signals reﬂect the actual costs of various elec-
tricity supply activities. In response to prices, demand-load modi-
ﬁcation could have a positive economic impact on society as a
whole by stimulating efﬁciency electricity system operations and
markets. In the medium and short term, the signaling of DR canoliou@tudelft.nl (E. Koliou),
ier.Reneses@iit.upcomillas.esresult in the adjustments of loads to network capacity constraints
in order to remain within technical limitations and diminish the
possibility of a system collapse. Alternatively, in the long term, DR is
useful for lowering both generation and network investment re-
quirements and minimizing permanent grid congestion (Batlle and
Rodilla, 2009).
In the US, interest in demand response rose in the early 1970s
from the penetration of air conditioning in American homes,
resulting in needle peaks and reduced load factors in system de-
mand proﬁles. At this time, there was increasing recognition of
rising system costs to meet the peaking loads, and utilities began to
view load management as a reliability resource (Cappers et al.,
2010; Koliou et al., 2014). After the passing of the Public Utilities
Regulatory Policy Act (PURPA) in the early 1980s, measures
designed to reduce demand peaks were set forth via the promotion
of load-management programs. Those involved both direct-control
and price-based programs for large industrial users (DOE, 2006).
Similarly, in Europe, large industrial customers provide demand
response ﬂexibility for balancing purposes in real-time system
operation.
The value and necessity of DR is recognized by the European
Commission (European Commission, 2013a). The Energy Efﬁciency
Directive (EED), Art.15, explicitly urges EU national regulatory au-
thorities to encourage demand-side resources, including DR, “to
participate alongside supply in wholesale and retail markets”, and
also to provide balancing and ancillary services to network opera-
tors in a non-discriminatory manner (Directive 2012/27/EU)
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icies advocating for DR to participate alongside supply inwholesale
markets calling for aggregation are the Directives 2009/72/EC
regarding common rules for the internal market in electricity, the
ENTSO-E 2013 Demand Connection Code, and the ACER 2012
Framework Guidelines on Electricity Balancing. Hence, mecha-
nisms for implementing DR are receiving increasing attention by
European regulatory authorities and institutions (CEER, 2011). DR
potential in the EU electricity markets is believed to be high but
currently underutilized (European Commission, 2013b), especially
for residential consumers, on account of current institutional ar-
rangements that cater to large generators and industrial customers.
The deployment of smart meters and information and
communication technology (ICT) infrastructure enables a paradigm
shift in the way electricity systems are operated, transforming
traditionally passive end-users into active market players
(Eurelectric, 2011; European Commission, 2013b, 2012b; Giordano
et al., 2011; Hancher et al., 2013). Different tariffs promote an
array of incentives for customers to modify consumption proﬁles
that, accordingly aid the system in achieving reliability objectives.
Price dependent DR refers to ﬁnancial incentives or penalties to
motivate customers to provide load ﬂexibility (Wang et al., 2010).
A range of options is available for designing and implementing
electricity tariffs (Reneses and Rodríguez Ortega, 2014). Due to the
indirect incentives that result from tariff design, different types of
load ﬂexibility can be expected from different pricing methods.
Until now, time-based pricing has been applied mostly to incen-
tivize large industrial users, leaving the approach unclear for resi-
dential customers. The literature on time-based pricing focuses on
demand response to serve the objectives of electricity supply
(Nieto, 2012), balancing (Koliou et al., 2014), and network purposes
(Bartusch and Alvehag, 2014). Consideration of network design and
grid constraints is gaining momentum, especially in systems with
high penetration levels of renewable energy sources (RES, both
distributed and large scale). Conchado et al. (2011) deﬁned bilateral
beneﬁts for both network and generation purposes (Conchado
et al., 2011). However, most of the literature does not take into
account the parallel effect of time-based pricing on the ﬁnal elec-
tricity bill of electricity users.
Therefore, a relevant contribution of this paper is an update to
the state of the art, in which both theoretical framework and
practical experiences are described for Europe. Furthermore, we
describe contemporary challenges today and provide recommen-
dations for how to overcome them via amendments to existing
European legislations as well as lessons learned from other policy
contexts.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a theo-
retical description of DR and Section 3 presents the necessary ele-
ments of electricity billing for incentivizing DR. Next, Section 4
presents examples of time-based prices for demand response in
Europe. Lastly, Section 5 outlines major barriers for DR activation
followed by conclusions and policy recommendations in Section 6.
2. Deﬁnition of demand response
The literature provides various deﬁnitions of demand response,
but a clear common theme is that DR reﬂects electricity demand
that is intentionally responsive (ﬂexible) to economic signals (see
Table 1 for frequently cited DR deﬁnitions in the literature and
policy documents). An important difference between demand
response and demand-side management is that demand side
management (DSM) can be seen as the over-arching concept that
can encompass demand response (in addition to energy efﬁciency
and electricity storage), driven by DSM adapters and policies
(Warren, 2014).In the US, as of 2014, DR programs alone were estimated to have
a potential of 28,934 MW consequently accounting for 6.2% of the
total peak demand (FERC, 2015). Within Europe, there are long
standing arrangements or programs to involve energy-intensive
industrial customers in DR (mostly through interruptible tariffs or
time-of-use pricing), and some system operators make use of large
avoided loads as part of their system balancing activities (Torriti
et al., 2010). Countries with large penetration of RES, such as Ger-
many, currently use demand ﬂexibility to maintain system-wide
reliability (Koliou et al., 2014).
Conceptually, DR also can be deﬁned as a ﬂexibility service that
is speciﬁed by (Eid et al., 2015):
- Direction (upward or downward);
- Size (kWh and kW);
- Time;
- Location (zone or node).
For example, an electricity network with congestion issues re-
quires location-speciﬁc demand ﬂexibility. When demand
responsiveness is aimed at sustaining system balance via market
arrangements, the location of DR is of less importance than the
aggregated direction, size, and timing.
2.1. Types of DR and effects on the electricity system
Demand-side management programs could be aimed toward
modifying traditional electricity demand in different ways (see
Table 2 for a visual presentation of the types of adjusted load
shapes). Demand response that is aimed at decreasing consump-
tion during peak times can be categorized as peak clipping. Load
shifting is mostly associated with usage reduction at peak that is
offset by usage in off-peak hours. DR that is aimed at increasing
consumption levels (for example at times with high renewable
energy production) can be categorized as valley ﬁlling, load
building, or ﬂexible load.
2.1.1. Beneﬁts of demand response to the electricity system
The potential beneﬁts of DR rest upon the energy policy pillars
associated with economic, environmental, and reliability objectives
(see Aghaei and Alizadeh, 2013). Economic or market-driven DR
reduces the general cost of energy supply while preserving
adequate reserve margins and mitigating price volatility by means
of short-term responses to electricity market conditions.
Environmental-driven DR would serve environmental and social
purposes by decreasing energy usage, increasing energy efﬁciency,
deﬁning commitment to environmentally friendly generation, and
reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Lastly, network-driven DR
aims tomaintain system reliability by decreasing demand in a short
period of time and reducing the need to enhance generation or
transmission capacity.
Batlle and Rodilla classify DR beneﬁts in accordance with time.
For the short and medium terms, DR would decrease network peak
and risk of system collapse by keeping electricity ﬂows within
technical constraints. In the long term, DR could decrease genera-
tion and network investment needs, relieve regular congestion, and
increase energy efﬁciency (Batlle and Rodilla, 2009).
In this work we deﬁne additional DR beneﬁts from a technical
system perspective based on alignment with time-based pricing.
Hakvoort and Koliou (2014) describe DR objectives associated with
day-ahead optimization, hour-ahead optimization, network peak
reduction, local balancing, real-time control, DG optimization and
central RES optimization. Secondary forthcoming effects include
CO2 reduction and decreased need for distribution and trans-
mission network investments. As discussed in Section 4, smaller,
Table 1
Frequently cited demand response deﬁnitions (Koliou, 2016).
Citation Deﬁnition
Deﬁnition is an extension of IEA (2003), quoted from
(Albadi and El-Saadany, 2008, p. 1990)
“DR includes all intentional electricity consumption pattern modiﬁcations by end-use customers that are intended
to alter the timing, level of instantaneous demand, or total electricity consumption.”
(Torriti et al., 2010) “Demand Response refers to a wide range of actions which can be taken at the customer side of the electricity meter
in response to particular conditions within the electricity system (such as peak period network congestion or high
prices).”
(Greeninga, 2010, p. 1519) “The very broad deﬁnition of demand response includes both modiﬁcation of electricity consumption by consumers
in response to price and the implementation of more energy efﬁcient technologies.”
(ACER, 2012, p. 8) “Changes in electric usage by end-use consumers from their normal load patterns in response to changes in
electricity prices and/or incentive payments designed to adjust electricity usage, or in response to the acceptance of
the consumer's bid, including through aggregation.”
Table 2
Adjusted load shapes as a result of DSM (Chuang and Gellings, 2008; Gellings, 1985; Hakvoort and Koliou, 2014).
Load shape DR type Load shape DR type
Peak Clipping Load Shifting
Valley Filling Flexible load shapes (dynamic energy management)
Load Building (Strategic Load Growth) Strategic Conservation (energy efﬁciency)
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be eligible for trade in central markets (such as balancing markets).
The aggregation function can be provided by an independent
aggregator, an electricity retailer, or even the network operator.
2.2. Activation of demand response
There are different ways to activate DR in the electricity system.
Broadly speaking, a distinction is made between “controllable”
(interruptible) and “price-based” DR (Pfeifenberger and Hajos,
2011; Muratori et al., 2014) also referred to as direct control and
indirect methods of load modiﬁcation, respectively.
Direct methods or controlled DR are applied in order to sustain
electricity supply reliability. These methods include direct load
control (DLC), load shedding, and intentional brown outs. Direct
load control simply means that a central actor (such as a system
operator, aggregator, or balancing authority) has direct access to
the load and is able tomake adjustments as required by the system.
Load shedding refers to the reduction of electricity consumption in
network zones in order to sustain total system reliability
(Newsham and Bowker, 2010). With brown outs, the system
operator slightly reduces voltage frequency in order reduce the
needed electricity transport capacity and generation capacity while
still maintaining electricity supply quality within limitations
(Blume, 2007). Direct methods for DR are contract-based and
therefore provide secure ﬂexibility in time and place for the system
operator based on central control.Price-based DR refers to “changes in electric usage by end-use
customers from normal consumption patterns in response to
changes in the price of electricity over time” (DOE, 2006). The
theory of price-based DR for large industrial electricity users was
discussed by David and Lee (1989). Pricing options include real-
time pricing (RTP), critical-peak pricing (CPP), time-of-use pricing
(TOU), and peak-time rebates (PTR) (Newsham and Bowker, 2010;
see Table 3). Drivers for such rates could be high wholesale market
prices or factors that jeopardize system reliability (Koliou et al.,
2013).
Price changes are more frequent in RTP than in TOU pricing. For
example, real-time prices might adjust on hourly basis, while TOU
prices might be adjusted for time blocks during the day (for
example four-hour periods). With CPP, the utility can on short
notice set a higher price to incentivize a load reduction. Speciﬁc
incentives can also be provided for baseline consumption adjust-
ments. In addition to time-based pricing and rebates, these include
interruptible-capacity (ICAP) and emergency demand-response
programs that allow system operators to instruct customers to
cease consumption on very short notice. Of course, pricingmethods
can also be combined; for example, TOU pricing can be combined
with a separate charge (demand charge) for peak consumption or a
PTR (Borenstein, 2005).
Depending on the electricity market design, a distribution sys-
tem operator (DSO), aggregator, retailer, and/or a third party could
provide separate price signals to the end user. With smart grids, ex-
ante tariffs can incorporate dynamic prices based on real-time
Table 3
Possible time-based pricing options for DER management (David and Lee, 1989; Faruqui and Sergici, 2009; Hakvoort and Koliou, 2014).
Basic time-based pricing options Speciﬁc incentives for baseline adjustment
Time-Of-
Use
(TOU)
Fixed electricity prices for
different time blocks within
a time period
€/kWh
t
Peak time rebates
(PTR)
A rebate when electricity is reduced
compared to baseline consumption,
within certain hours in a year.
Real-
Time-
Pricing
(RTP)
An hourly rate depending
on the day ahead real-time
price of electricity
€/kWh
t
Interruptible
Capacity Program
(ICAP), Interruptible
load
A rebate when electricity is reduced
below a baseline value.
Critical
Peak
Pricing
(CPP)
High electricity price
periods for certain (ﬁxed)
days of time within a year
€/kWh
t
Emergency Demand
Response
Mandatory commitment to reduce
load, with penalties if not supplied.
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are minimum trading values for the balancing and other free
markets, small users must be bundled or aggregated to simulta-
neously provide signiﬁcant tradable amounts of ﬂexibility in those
markets (see Section 4). Aggregation and load bundling can occur
per load type, e.g. EVs can be represented by one entity and home
battery systems by another.Fig. 1. Usual breakdown of electricity retail rates in a competitive environment
(Eurelectric, 2013).3. Time-based tariffs within the billing context
Electricity pricing is an important method by which end-user
demand response can be incentivized while maintaining volun-
tary choice. The ﬁnal electricity bill depends on the respective cost-
components and other (policy) objectives associated with the
charges allowed under the tariff. This section sequentially describes
cost allocation (Section 3.1), customer charging (Section 3.2), and
demand response aspects within this context (Section 3.3).3.1. Cost allocation
Fundamentally, electricity billing is set up to ensure cost re-
covery of the supplied electricity service. Costs are here seen as the
incurred expenses by the retailer or utility to deliver the electricity
service, while charges are the fees that are imposed upon the
customer for respective use of the electricity service. Cost allocation
involves themethods bywhich electricity supply costs are allocated
to electricity customers. If electricity prices are reﬂective of the
costs caused to the system, pricing is considered cost-causality
based (Rodríguez Ortega et al., 2008; Sotkiewicz and Vignolo,
2007).
Traditionally, electricity systems were operated by large verti-
cally integrated electricity utilities (combining electricity genera-
tion and transport) to with their own electricity billing structures
and tariff levels. This model still prevails in many US states and
other countries, where electricity is billed by a central public ser-
vice utility whose regulated tariffs could reﬂect combined network
and electricity supply costs incurred to the ﬁnal user. Alternatively,in a liberalized electricity sector, the monopolistic components of
the electricity value chain (the electricity transport network) are
unbundled from the competitive parts (e.g. generation and retail).
The general composition of the cost allocation elements in the
liberalized electricity market model (mainly prevailing in Europe)
is presented in Fig. 1.3.1.1. Electricity production
Traditionally electricity is supplied from large conventional
units such as nuclear, coal, and gas power plants that directly feed
electricity to high voltage grids. For sustaining reliable electricity
supply, at each moment in time and at each network node, gen-
eration and demand should be kept in balance. Consequently,
depending on the electricity demand in time, generation units are
synchronously operated to automatically supply the actual demand
of electricity from a generation-follows-demand perspective.
However, enabled by smart-grid technologies, increasing levels
of demand are now served by stochastic supply from renewable
resources and distributed generation. This electricity is not only fed
to the high-voltage grids, but also to the low-voltage grids through
C. Eid et al. / Utilities Policy 40 (2016) 15e25 19“prosumption” (Perez-Arriaga et al., 2013).1 Consequently, in future
electricity systems the generation-follows-demand perspective is
increasingly replaced by a demand-follows-generation perspective.
This transition requires that electricity consumers receive real-time
reﬂective information regarding the electricity prices through dy-
namic pricing (Perez-Arriaga et al., 2013).
From an economic perspective, electricity production and con-
sumption can be traded in different ways. In a system with
wholesale market competition, for example, at each moment in
time the generation units compete to supply the largest share of
demand and the market price is set by the cost of the marginal unit
(the unit that is supplying each additional kWh demand of elec-
tricity). In most countries, wholesale electricity market design has
evolved toward the use of short-term marginal costs (normally
hour-by-hour, every half hour, or even every ﬁve minutes) as the
optimal economic signal for energy trading (Reneses and Rodríguez
Ortega, 2014). Depending on the available energy mix (the range of
types of generation units in a market), the market price is set by the
highest priced marginal unit that can supply an additional unit of
electricity in the market at a speciﬁc moment in time.
In addition to this wholesale market price, which in many cases
reﬂects the real-time price of electricity (for DR purposes), elec-
tricity can be traded in liberalized electricity markets in other ways.
Retailers and producers can set up bilateral contracts for electricity
supply, where only a small part of the electricity demand is traded
in real-time. Capacity markets are also utilized for long term pro-
curement of electricity provision by all market parties. Alterna-
tively, where there is no liberalized market, the system operator
solely operates its plants centrally and assigns the right unit at the
right times for meeting the electricity demand.3.1.2. Cost for electricity transport
Electricity networks are the transport carriers for supplying
electricity from the point of generation to the location of demand.
Those networks can be categorized as transmission and distribu-
tion networks. Transmission networks are high-voltage (HV) net-
works that transfer electricity from production plants to
substations located near electricity demand. This is distinct from
the local networks that distribute low-voltage power to customers.
For both transmission and distribution networks, most of the
incurred costs are large investments associated with capital
expenditure (CAPEX). Operation and maintenance costs (OPEX)
generally represent a much lower portion of total network costs.
This distinction is mostly relevant for the remuneration of the
network operators, but is of less importance when cost-based tar-
iffs are designed. For this purpose, the total cost is used as input
data and allocated to the different network users (consumers,
generators and prosumers) according to the costs they cause.
In a traditional electricity system, the distribution system is the
ﬁnal stage in the delivery of electric power; it carries electricity
from the transmission system to individual consumers. Emerging
cost allocation methods anticipate further development of DG, DR,
and prosumption. As technology allows, electricity ﬂows can move
not only from high-voltage to low-voltage grids, but also among
distribution networks from low-voltage to high-voltage grids if a
high level of DG or DR resources become available. These de-
velopments suggest that locational price signals might be an
advisable regulatory instrument (Reneses and Rodríguez Ortega,
2014), on account of aggregate system pricing diluting location
speciﬁc signals for triggering demand-side load modiﬁcation1 Prosumption refers to the presence of electricity customers that are able to both
consume and produce electricity based on DG ownership, grid connection, and a
method of compensation.measures.
3.1.3. Other costs
Besides the main processes of electricity generation and trans-
port, there are other costs related to policy, metering and customer
services, regulation, and reconciliation. Policy costs involved in the
electricity supply service include subsidies and taxes for attaining
certain policy goals. Examples are subsidies to low-income con-
sumers, tax-incentives, and feed-in-tariffs for renewable electricity
generation. These costs, like others, are variable across types of
customers and dependent on context.
Costs related to metering and customer services involve ex-
penses in the ﬁnal stage of electricity supply. These include the cost
for call centers and customer assistance, and other costs related to
metering equipment and its maintenance. Especially in a liberal-
ized market, there are costs related to the regulation of electricity
supply service. Lastly, reconciliation costs are adjustment costs
from one year to another. Those costs are ex-ante credited and
corrected after ex-post.
3.2. Charging the customer
The various costs described abovemake their way into customer
charges through the regulated retail tariff, which can be partly
politically inﬂuenced. Certain customers may be exempt from
paying for certain charges for policy reasons.
When designing cost-reﬂective charges for regulated electric
activities, a distinction is often made between CAPEX and OPEX. As
noted, there generally is not a direct relationship between CAPEX
and ﬁxed charge or OPEX and variable charge (either capacity or
energy). For example, when the DSO invests in ﬁxed assets for the
purpose of reducing energy losses, these costs would constitute
CAPEX for the DSO. However, within tariff design, this cost should
be included in the energy charge (V/kWh), since the investment
has been made in order to reduce energy losses that relate to en-
ergy consumption. Therefore, the distinction between CAPEX and
OPEX does not carry over to the ﬁxed and variable parts of the retail
price. In reality, strict adherence to fully cost-based pricing requires
frequent adjustments to charges and therefore complex tariff
design (Eid et al., 2013). Moreover, it could also reduce signal clarity
and jeopardize cost recovery over the long term (Reneses and
Rodríguez Ortega, 2014).
3.2.1. Traditional electricity billing
Typical billing components on electricity bills are the energy
charge (V/kWh), a capacity charge (V/kW), an access charge (a one-
time payment), and the customer charge (a yearly or monthly
payment). Traditional electricity charging does not further cate-
gorize between consumers and prosumers with uniform rate
structures. However, in a smart-grid environment where demand
participation is fostered, end-user tariffs can incorporate customer
categorization, time and location (Picciariello et al., 2015). See
Table 4 for some examples.
The application of dynamic prices is different for vertically in-
tegrated utilities providing a single (integral) tariff as compared to
regulated and private service providers in a liberalized market. The
electricity tariff could therefore be divided in the nature of the costs
(distribution or retail prices) and these prices could be ﬂat or time-
dependent. Otherwise the arrangements could be set for an inde-
pendent aggregator. The ﬁnal tariff could reﬂect full-dynamic pri-
ces, semi-dynamic prices, or another pricing arrangements with for
example a new actor like an aggregator. If the full dynamic price
comprises of an integral tariff in which a single price incorporates
both retail and distribution costs. Alternatively, a full dynamic price
could be set up by two different prices for both retail and
Table 4
Tariff components and options for tariff design (Eid et al., 2013).
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electricity is can be ﬁxed price, for example like the customer
charge in the United States. Other arrangements could be that an
aggregator sets up a speciﬁc contract for demand response (See
Fig. 2).3.2.2. Pricing to promote demand response
For some methods of electricity pricing, including pricing for
ﬂexible and reliable demand response, the installation of technical
devices is required. For example, with peak-time rebates the
baseline consumption level of the customer is needed in order to
rebate for the supplied DR. With direct control methods, in-home
automation is needed that communicates with the signal from
the aggregator for example (or other actor that contracts the ﬂex-
ibility of the end-user). Table 5 provides some examples of tariff
options and required smart-metering and home adjustments for
the customer to be able to supply the DR Service.
Certain types of demand ﬂexibility are required in similar ways
for the entire year (for example in case of highly congested trans-
mission lines), while other types of ﬂexibility could only require
infrequent response during speciﬁc events per year (for example,
due to extreme weather conditions). From a tariff perspective, this
requires a distinction between permanent and transient price sig-
nals. Permanent signals reﬂecting variations in price related to
time, location, size, and direction are mostly used for higher costs
categories, such as those related to generation and transmission
constraints. This is the case for yearly set TOU rates based on
electricity consumption in a frequently congested area or differentFig. 2. Different billing methods togeneration costs during the day. Alternatively, transient signals can
be used to reﬂect variations in distribution costs. Thus, if a zone is
congested during only some hours of the year, non-permanent
punctual signals such as CPP can be used in that zone.
Time-based and dynamic pricing can furthermore be obligatory
or voluntary, with and without opt-in or opt-out methods (Faruqui
et al., 2010). In most of the US there is no retail competition; rates
for households and small commercial utilities are set by the regu-
lator, who is free to approve a dynamic pricing tariff as a default or
option. In the EU, customers would have to actively choose a
dynamic-price tariff. Only customers who can lower their bills will
voluntarily choose time-based rates. The rate of adoption is a crit-
ical point; adoption could bemuch lower if customersmust actively
switch to time-based pricing, rather than having it as the default.
4. Examples of demand response projects
Demand response is applied in different ways globally, with
industrial electricity users being themain providers of system-wide
demand-side ﬂexibility. This section provides some examples of DR
programs in both the industrial and residential electricity sector.
4.1. Industrial demand response
The advantage of having large industrial consumers provide
demand response is that their change in consumption patterns
signiﬁcantly affects the electricity system as a whole. Speciﬁcally,
industry accounts for more than one third of total electricityincentivize demand response.
Table 5
Tools required for demand response activation.
Tariff option Tools
In-home pricing display Real-time-metering (Smart metering) Access to baseline consumption curve In-home demand control
Direct Load Control Optional Optional (only with additional price based tariff) Not required Required
Real-Time-Pricing Required Required Not required Optional
Critical-Peak-Pricing Required Required Optional Optional
Peak-Time-Rebates Required Required Required Optional
Time-of-Use pricing Optional Required Not required Optional
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predictability of load patterns (EEA, 2012). Aggregation is cost
effective and reliable in large volumes due to the tradability of their
load ﬂexibility on balancing and reserve markets. In addition to
aggregation, large industrial users could also be subject to timed-
based or dynamic-pricing from their supplier or TSO in order to
incentivize demand response. Below we discuss examples of in-
dustrial DR that provide insight into the role of aggregation.
4.1.1. France: Energy Pool
In France, Energy Pool is an aggregator that started operation in
2008. Its clients are mainly large industries (data centers, hospitals,
residential and tertiary buildings, refrigerated warehouses, water
cleaning and treatment facilities, and electric vehicles) that are
geographically spread across the country. DR consists of around
1000 MW ﬂexible capacity in the form of load reduction. Energy
Pool takes charge of optimal decision-making for the industrial
user's DR: it identiﬁes ﬂexibility potential, integrates the DR into
the normal business processes of its clients, and offers the ﬂexibility
in differentmarkets. Thesemarkets are the balancingmarkets (day-
ahead and intraday), security reserve markets (long-term contracts
and emergency operations), and capacity markets (mid-term or
long-term contracts). Energy Pool clients receive speciﬁc payments
for their participation in load management programs. Energy Pool
now operates besides in France also in the UK and Belgium and has
contracts with the TSOs in those countries.2 (Energy Pool, 2015).
4.1.2. United Kingdom: ﬂextricity
Flextricity is an industrial DR aggregator that started operation
in 2004 in the United Kingdom. Flextricity provides both genera-
tion and load aggregation, meaning that it can incentivize clients
for upward and downward load management and eventually trade
this ﬂexibility in markets. Flextricity's clients are large industrial
and commercial customers (more than 500 kW) and owners of
small hydro and stand-by generators.3
Usually there is no cost at all for the consumers to participate in
Flexitricity's aggregation programs, as the company itself installs
the communication, metering, and control equipment. The ﬂexi-
bility is supplied to short-term operating reserve (STOR) (genera-
tors), which is a service for the provision of additional active power
from generation or demand reduction if power fails or demand is
higher than expected. Furthermore, DR is used for triad manage-
ment (comparable with critical peak), which is carefully targeted
generation and demand reduction to optimize revenues for the
involved businesses in contingency situations. Lastly, this DR is
provided for frontline generation and load adjustment on short
notice (below 10 s for 750 kW or more).
Furthermore in the industrial and large commercial sectors,
energy-intensive users are able to enter TOU or interruptible con-
tracts with suppliers. Similarly, the transmission system operator2 See the website of Energy Pool: http://www.energy-pool.eu/.
3 See the website of Flextricity: https://www.ﬂexitricity.com/.can contract such large users directly as part of their network
balancing activities (Torriti et al., 2010).4.2. Residential demand response
4.2.1. France: direct load control and Tempo Tariff
An example of rigorous DR is direct load control (DLC) of the
customer load by a central actor. Direct load control is mostly
applied when the system is in a contingency situation and usually
leaves no freedom for the user. An example is provided by the
aggregator Voltalis in Brittany, France.4 Customers contracted with
Voltalis receive a free device installed in their home, named Blue-
pod, which reduces heating operations in short time intervals when
Voltalis receives a signal from the TSO based on endangered elec-
tricity supply sufﬁciency. In this DR program, customers are auto-
matically enrolled, but can opt-out at any time by pushing a button
on the device and using their heater as usual. Users do not receive
an additional ﬁnancial beneﬁt, but observe a reduction of their
normal electricity bill (usually 5e10%) due to the interruptions. The
advantage of this type of DR is that it requires no additional tariff
settlement, and therefore is easy to implement.
In France, a combination of CPP and TOU pricing is also appli-
cable for customers that apply for the Tempo Tariff. Electricite de
France (EDF), had in 2010 around 350,000 residential customers
and more than 100,000 small business customers using the Tempo
tariff. Within this tariff scheme, days are distinguished according to
price using a color system, together with an indication of whether
the hour is currently one of eight off-peak hours. Customers can
adjust their consumption either manually or by selecting a program
for automatic connection and disconnection of separate water and
space-heating circuits. It has been estimated that for the average
1 kW French house, the Tempo tariff brought about a reduction in
consumption of 15% on ‘‘white’’ days and 45% on ‘‘red’’ days. On
average, customers have saved 10% on their electricity bill (Torriti
et al., 2010), which can be signiﬁcant especially considering harsh
winters the reliance of a majority of French households on electric
heating.4.2.2. Sweden: DR for network congestions
Sweden is one of the few countries in Europe with 100% smart
meter roll-out (Eurelectric, 2013). A portion of the customers from
DSO Sala Heby Energi Eln€at AB, the electricity distribution area that
covers the provincial country town Sala and its environs, receive a
TOU price for electricity distribution service.
Prior to the introduction of the demand-based time-of-use
electricity distribution tariff (henceforth referred to as the demand-
based tariff), all households in the local electricity.distribution area
of the utility were charged according to a conventional distribution
tariff composed of an annual ﬁxed access charge (SEK/yr.), the rate
of which was dependent on fuse size, and a variable distribution4 See the website of Voltalis: http://www.voltalis.com/.
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of the ﬁxed access charge (SEK/yr.) and a variable distribution
charge (SEK/kW) that is calculated based on the average of the ﬁve
highest hourly meter readings during peak hours. In off-peak
hours, electricity distribution is free of charge.
In the duration of the program, households experienced an
average individual peak demand reduction between 9.3% and 7.5%.
When considering the peak in the distribution system, therewas an
average reduction between 15.6% and 8.4%. The total shift from
peak to off-peak hours was between 2.4 and 0.2 h (Bartusch and
Alvehag, 2014). Individual households saw a decrease from 14% to
41% in costs over the duration of the project. An analysis of the
project attributes some of the savings to prices that were set too
low (Bartusch et al., 2011).Fig. 4. Dynamic transport tariff on week day with load curve in Watt and the transport
tariff in V (Kohlmann et al., 2011).4.2.3. The Netherlands: DR pilot for electricity transport and supply
In the Netherlands, the DSO Enexis has formed a consortium
with an energy retailer (Greenchoice) and a project developer
(Heja) to conduct a pilot in an apartment block and a group of semi-
detached houses in Breda. This project tested dynamic retail, dis-
tribution, and local production pricing for household consumers.
The retail tariff is based on the day-ahead price variation that is
multiplied by a factor in order to make the average price equal to
one if the traditional ﬁxed kWh price for electricity from the sup-
plier would be charged (this ﬁxed price was around 0.2193 V/kWh
during the pilot). This results in a retail price ﬂuctuating between
0.06 V/kWh and 0.36 V/kWh each day (see Fig. 3).
The transport tariff is a dynamic peak-pricing scheme, which is
dependent on the daily peak-hours and not solely critical peak
hours at event days within a year. The peak pricing scheme for
transport applied to consumption taking place above 80% of the
consumption load during the daily peak. During days with a high
morning peak (such as weekend days), these hours are also charged
the peak price (see Fig. 4) (Kohlmann et al., 2011).
In the pilot project, smart appliances react to day-ahead market
prices automatically. A smart appliance is ﬁtted with additional ICT
components connecting it to the grid. The appliances for this
project are the so-called ‘wet appliances’ (washing machine, dish-
washer and tumble dryer).
In the Netherlands (and most other European countries), the
DSO is a natural monopoly that should provide non-discriminatory
third-party access; it is not allowed to hamper or affect market
activities for retailers or other market parties due to the possibility
of price discrimination. Dynamic tariffs that vary in both time and
place might discriminate customers by increasing price in a
geographic area speciﬁcally with capacity problems, and not inFig. 3. Dynamic retail price with the straight line providing the standard electricity
price as charged by the electricity supplier (Kohlmann et al., 2011).neighboring areas without capacity problems (Lunde et al., 2015).
Therefore legal considerations may limit general application of the
tariff settlement used in this pilot project.5. Challenges for development of DR in Europe
Depending on system characteristics and the extent of elec-
tricity sector liberalization, different barriers exist for DR activation.
The following sections present the major issues that must be
addressed.5.1. Initial technology investments
The installation of smart meters, in-home displays, and other
devices for enabling DR is costly. For example, the installation cost
of a smart meter in Europe is on average between V 200e250.5 An
important question is who initiates the installation of smart
metersdthe consumer, the retailer, the aggregator, or the DSO?
This common split incentives problem is related to the fact that the
costs and beneﬁts from ﬂexible demand should be split between
the end-user and the enabling actor, in view of creating a viable
business case for both (Hakvoort and Koliou, 2014).
For example, if the electricity retailer invests in the smart meter,
and the customer wants to change suppliers, this investment by the
settled retailer is essentially foregone. If the DSO makes the in-
vestment, this constitutes a competitive advantage compared to
the retailer because the DSO can use prices to alter consumption for
network purposes. Without any clear business model for in-
vestments, no actor will make the ﬁrst move. It is important that
those beneﬁting from DR, directly or indirectly, pay for the costs
(Energy Pool, 2015). Consequently, the value of DR should be
distributed along the electricity supply chain, together with in-
centives for participation for each agent under clearly elaborated
business models (Hancher et al., 2013). Therefore, taking into ac-
count that environmental beneﬁts of DR are socialized, the cost also
could be settled in a socialized manner. And just as it is the case in
many markets with priority access for renewables, priority access
for demand response in markets could further support its de-
velopments (Koliou et al., 2014).5 See the website of the European Commission http://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/
topics/markets-and-consumers/smart-grids-and-meters.
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The coordination problem is another issue associated with DR
deployment (Hakvoort and Koliou, 2014). At a certain points in
time, some actors involved in electricity supply could require the
demand to be adjusted downward, while others could actually
require upward demand adjustments. This is especially the case in
liberalized electricity sectors, where the network and supply
functions are unbundled from each other. In Germany, for example,
oversupply of wind electricity can result in low supply costs, while
simultaneous network capacity limits can result in high trans-
mission costs. Therefore, trying to incorporate multiple purposes
over a time horizon with competing effects is impractical and may
lead to unclear economic incentives. How customers respond de-
pends on their price elasticity relative to the particular load
modiﬁcation. Therefore, the assessment of the exact load modiﬁ-
cation, its time horizon, and the price elasticity for such response
must be taken into account. The coordination issue requires that
tariffs ex-ante manage interactions for speciﬁc moments in time
when opposing signals appear. Furthermore it requires re-
consideration of regulation in liberalized electricity markets
where the DSO is not allowed to hamper market activity with
network tariffs due to non-discriminatory third-party access rules.
In a liberalized sector, in addition to retail and network charges,
taxes could further affect price-signal clarity. Alternatively, in a
vertically integrated system, the coordination problem is less likely
to occur because the utility is able to directly incorporate conﬂict-
ing effects in a ﬁnal price. Consequently, it is recommended that
policy-makers ﬁx a prioritized set of objectives with the pricing
methodology for both electricity supply and transport. For
example, signals related to security of supply should take
precedence.
5.3. Incumbent issues: ﬂexibility and traditional markets
In Europe, the need for demand ﬂexibility from the residential
sector is not critical in many places due to sufﬁcient capacity within
the distribution grid and ﬂexibility provision from industrial con-
sumers. However, in the next 15e20 years, when RES are expected
to provide a signiﬁcant part of the electricity production (based on
the very ambitious European target of 100% RES in 2050), activating
residential ﬂexibility will become increasingly important. As dis-
cussed already by Koliou et al. (2014), the rules for balancing,
ancillary, and real-time trading should be adjusted to accommodate
aggregated load ﬂexibility. If aggregators are hampered to provide
ﬂexibility services, the transition toward a renewable based elec-
tricity system becomes a greater challenge. Traditional peaking
units in many RES based systems, however, already cope with
recovering stranded costs and would be further affected by DR that
shifts income to aggregators.
Another important issue is described by Eurelectric with respect
to the need for a compensation mechanism that guarantees that
electricity suppliers are not penalized for imbalances caused by
activities of (independent) aggregators (Eurelectric, 2015). When-
ever the aggregator reduces or increases electricity consumption,
the deviation is reported in a schedule to the TSO, who will correct
the respective balance. Financial compensation should be paid to
the balance group for the energy that is consumed or not consumed
due to the control of the aggregator. This issue is less problematic if
the aggregator is the retailer. The DSO could also take responsibility
for DR aggregation. However, within a liberalized electricity sector,
the option of DR for commercial purposes is legally not allowed due
to required unbundling of the DSO from market functionalities.
Newmarket design options allowing for expanded use of locational
pricing could incentivize additional resource efﬁciency.5.4. Non-sustainable side-effects of DR: shifting peaks and
increasing emissions
A relevant issue with DR tariff schemes is that instead of peak
reduction and valley ﬁlling, a shifted peak is frequently observed.
The low electricity price in valley hours, therefore recreates a
transferred peak in time. In France this issue is tackled by differ-
entiating prices for regions in order for DR to smooth loads in
desirable ways.
As described in Section 2.1.1, there are energy-mix dependent
consequences of load shifting from peak to off-peak periods. The
economic effects of consuming electricity from cheaper production
(like coal), might lead to less operation of more expensive units
(such as gas ﬁred plans). Depending on the current merit order,
sometimes load shifting might induce higher CO2 emissions as a
result of increasing base-load production that is then met by coal-
ﬁred units, while reducing peak-load generation that could be met
by cleaner, gas-ﬁred units (Conchado et al., 2011; Holland and
Mansur, 2008). However, a higher CO2 emission price may help to
mitigate this effect to a large extent.
6. Discussion and policy recommendations
This paper provided both a theoretical and practice-oriented
overview of time-based and dynamic pricing to incentivize de-
mand response for different electricity ﬂexibility needs. In Europe,
various DR efforts are visible for industrial and residential users,
although the contribution of residential users to DR remains small.
Even though in many countries there is currently no urgency for
demand response from the residential sector due to overcapacity in
the distribution grid, in the next years, renewable energy sources
(often distributed) are expected to provide for a signiﬁcant part of
electricity supply. In this situation, adaptive and ﬂexible electricity
demand could beneﬁt reliability and cost efﬁciency at the distri-
bution level as well.
In a liberalized electricity sector, taxes, network charges, and
retail charges are separately deﬁned and this can affect price signal
clarity for the end-user. We recommend that policy-makers ﬁx a
prioritized set of objectives with the pricing methodology for both
electricity supply and transport. For example, signals related to
security of supply should take precedence. In a vertically integrated
system, the coordination problem is less likely because the utility is
able to directly incorporate conﬂicting effects in the ﬁnal tariff. We
recommend designing prices so that “permanent” signals are sent
for capital cost categories while “transient” signals are sent for
operational distribution and energy costs. For example, when DR is
incentivized for handling long-term objectives associated with
production and grid capacity constraints, price incentives can be set
ex-ante rather than tied to real-time costs (through, for example, a
TOU price). For long term planning, effective incorporation of de-
mand response into capacity markets can contribute to minimize
the need for generation resources, in turn bringing down overall
cost of procurement.
Further research is needed regarding how time-based and dy-
namic pricing for DR might incorporate signals for other types of
ﬂexibility, including distributed generation, storage, and electric
vehicle (EV) charging. The interaction of those different sources of
ﬂexibility is consequently of importance; for example, contradic-
tions to sustainable objectives might result if usage is priced lower
than storage. Lastly, the role of both incumbent and new actors in
the electricity sector should be clear when designing DR incentives.
Especially in a liberalized electricity sector, the value of DR along
the electricity supply chain, the incentives for each agent's partic-
ipation, and the business models for DR should be clear so that the
initial smart-grid investment can be pursued by any the actors
C. Eid et al. / Utilities Policy 40 (2016) 15e2524involved. Further research is also needed with regard to the use of
locational pricing to incentivize additional resource efﬁciency.
Current zonal and country level pricing dilutes locational incentives
for demand-side load modiﬁcation.
In conclusion, we note that demand response is not an objective
in itself, but a potentially efﬁcient and sustainable tool for elec-
tricity systems with growing needs for ﬂexibility. Is DR economi-
cally relevant for systems with spare generation capacity? In that
case, what is the best option for introducing DR when conventional
units are already coping with cost-recovery problems? These
questions remain open and require that policy-makers prioritize
objectives with regard to electricity and sustainability in the sector.
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